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Abstract
With Lisbon, the European Parliament formally acquired an equal standing to that of the Council of the EU in the making
of policies in the AFSJ (area of freedom, security and justice). However, the growing political salience of policy issues at
stake and bottom‐up politicisation in the AFSJ has had the unintended effect of undermining the European Parliament’s
internal unity even under consultation procedures. To show how this played out in practice during Europe’s migration and
refugee crisis, this article analyses the European Parliament’s role, preferences, and bargaining position in the making of
two Refugee Relocation Decisions (Council Decisions 2015/1523 and 2015/1601) under consultation procedure. To do so,
this article exploits Putnam’s two‐level framework (level I and II politics throughout the policy‐making process) to explore
early agenda‐setting attempts and groups’ positions on issues of refugee relocation and burden‐sharing, as they were for‐
mally stated in their position papers and expressed at the LIBE Committee and at plenary. This article shows that the high
domestic salience and politicization of the issues at stake left MEPs torn between competing principals at home andwithin
their European Parliament political groups and had the effect of weakening overall unity on the issue of refugee relocation.
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1. Introduction
It is undeniable that, over time, and particularly after
the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty, the European
Parliament (EP) has seen its power and influence as
co‐legislator grow remarkably in the AFSJ (area of
freedom, security and justice; see Hampshire, 2016;
Hix & Høiland, 2011; Trauner & Ripoll Servent, 2016).
While growing used to behave more consensually
under co‐decision, members of the European Parliament
(MEPs) remain portrayed as being comparatively more
confrontational under consultation procedures, pushing
forward ‘Christmas wish lists’ with ‘left‐wing, liberty‐
oriented positions’ in justice and home affairs (JHA;
Ripoll Servent, 2012, p. 67; see also Ripoll Servent, 2015).
In many ways, the entry into force of the Treaty
of Lisbon and the gradual move away from consul‐
tation provided the EP with a timely opportunity of
institutional adaptation (Ripoll Servent, 2012): That is,
to close the gap between these two ‘schizophrenic’
behaviours in co‐decision vis‐à‐vis consultation pro‐
cedures (Ripoll Servent, 2012, p. 68). Nevertheless,
more recent policy developments in the AFSJ—most
notably, the use of consultation for formulating key pol‐
icy responses to the migration crisis (i.e., the Refugee
Relocation Decisions under Council Decisions 2015/1523
and 2015/1601 and the EU‐Turkey Statement) and the
political impasse reached under various co‐decision pro‐
cedures (e.g., the so‐called Dublin Regulation Recast and
the Asylum Procedure Regulation)—have suggested that
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member states ‘remain privileged policy entrepreneurs
in the AFSJ’ (Trauner & Ripoll Servent, 2016, p. 1429).
The missed change for the EP to transform the Treaty
of Lisbon into an opportunity for institutional change
became all the more visible in the shaping of emer‐
gency responses to the migration and refugee crisis, par‐
ticularly the two Refugee Relocation Decisions (Council
Decision (EU) 2015/1523 of 14 September 2015, 2015;
Council Decision (EU) 2015/1601 of 22 September 2015,
2015), adopted under a special consultation proce‐
dure as provided by Article 78(3) of the Treaty on
the Functioning of the European Union. Soon after the
two Refugee Relocation Decisions were adopted, former
EP President Schulz criticized member states for being
responsible of unambitious policy responses to the crisis:
The European supranational institutions have shown
their readiness to act. The European Parliament
has supported the European Commission—the EU’s
executive—in its courageous push for a binding sys‐
tem to help the countries most exposed to the
refugee crisis. On the other hand, EU member states
often preach solidarity when it suits them and resist
it when it does not….It is not the European Union—
or Brussels—that is broken. It is the intergovern‐
mental decision‐making process jealously guarded by
national capitals that has once again proven its inef‐
fectiveness. (Schulz, 2015)
It is indeed true that under consultation and faced by
conditions of structurally limited power and influence
in the legislative procedure, the EP could only ‘lobby’
other institutions (Hix & Noury, 2009, p. 19) and try to
demand radical change in a united manner to be some‐
what influential (see, for instance, Kardasheva, 2009;
Varela, 2009). At the same time, in view of the heated
intergovernmental debate and impasse found at the
Council on the refugee relocation decisions (Barigazzi &
de La Baume, 2015), this article explores whether the
highly salient ‘nature of the problem and the absence of
a shared “common bad” ’ (Ripoll Servent, 2019, p. 307)
were reflected in a less united, thereby even less influen‐
tial EP. In other words, the article analyses whether the
high political stakes and domestic salience on the issues
at stake cast “the shadow of intergovernmentalism” on
intra‐EP dynamics too, in such a way that they prevented
the EP from pushing forward an ambitious, maximalist
agenda on these issues, and undermined any chance for
the institution to act united in the formulation of these
two refugee relocation decisions.
In order to study this, the article analyses the role,
bargaining position and preference formation of the
EP in the formulation of the refugee relocation deci‐
sions. The article argues that the EP initially tried to
strengthen its odds in influencing the negotiations by
gathering broad support across political groups and craft‐
ing a Report in full respect of the existing competing
interests on the issues of irregular migration and asylum.
As shown in this article, between 2013 and early 2015
the EP was arguably successful in its efforts as a whole,
pushing for policy change on the issues of refugee relo‐
cation and intra‐European solidarity. However, as media
salience on the issues at stake increased in the Spring of
2015, so did public attention on thesematters. Increased
salience made MEPs more likely to defect, that is to
vote against their EP political group’s line when a conflict
between their national party and their EP group arose.
Bottom‐up politicization, much alike the one that under‐
mined consensus in the Council (Barigazzi & de La Baume,
2015), pre‐empted the EP from being influential in the
formulation of the two Refugee Relocation Decisions.
This finding is consistent with existing literature on
defection and abstentions in the EP, according to which
MEPs are more likely to defect or abstain from their EP
group’s position ‘on specific questions that are of par‐
ticular importance to them, but not on a general basis
(Faas, 2003, p. 860; see also Hix, 2002; Klüver & Spoon,
2015; Koop et al., 2018), particularly when these ques‐
tions coincide with crucial interests of an MEP’s national
party which need to be respected in order to stand for
re‐election (Mühlböck, 2017, p. 60).
In this article, Section 2 presents the methodology
and theoretical framework in use. Section 3 reviews the
EP’s attempts of agenda‐setting as from 2013. Section 4
analyses the various EP groups’ positions on refugee relo‐
cation at the outbreak of themigration and refugee crisis,
so as to serve as the basis for comparison between early
political objectives in the unfolding of the crisis and the
ultimate policy‐making outcome. Sections 5 and 6 analy‐
se level I and level II coalition‐building efforts and power
dynamics within the EP.
2. Theory and Methods
Seeing as the main preoccupation of this article is to
understand whether, and if so in what ways, the entan‐
glement between domestic and international politics
played out in undermining the intra‐EP unity under
consultation, some theories of European integration
could be seen as the best fitting theoretical framework.
However, rather than linking the findings of this article
to a specific theory of integration, this article will criti‐
cally contribute to the wider debate on European inte‐
gration by showing how to explain the growing inter‐
nal divide in the EP in making policies in the AFSJ, even
under consultation. This methodological choice was con‐
sidered most appropriate in view of the inherent weak‐
nesses of existing theories of European integration to
explain EU bargaining dynamics. According to Putnam
himself, neo‐functionalist theories have the crucial short‐
coming of disregarding the impact of domestic poli‐
tics in favour of a more transnational, interdependence‐
based approach, using as dependent variable ‘the
hypothesized evolution of new supranational institu‐
tions, rather than specific policy developments’ in such
a way that whenever ‘European integration stalled, so
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did this literature’ (Putnam, 1988, p. 431). Even state‐
centric theories of integration, such as Liberal and new
Intergovernmentalism, are too static and narrow to
account for the longer ‘time horizon preferences’ and
issue‐linkages (Moravcsik, 2018, p. 1667) which usu‐
ally drive the behaviour of policy actors in the AFSJ.
While post‐functionalism could be somewhat useful to
account for the centrality of exclusive identity in shaping
MEPs’ voting behaviour and ultimate decision to defect
(Hooghe & Marks, 2009), as well as the influence of
national parties on the EP, it does not tell usmuch regard‐
ing interactions at the EU level of governance other than
noting that domestic politics influences the constraints
of decision‐makers (Schmidt, 2019, p. 1025).
In an attempt to deconstruct political incentives com‐
ing from the domestic and the supranational arenas,
the article’s analytical approach follows Putnam’s (1988)
two‐level game theory. This analytical framework was
deemed most suitable for the purposes of this study
as it allows for the study of simultaneous interactions,
pressures and influences between the EU (level I) and
domestic (level II) levels of governance, while keeping
a focus on EU politics. Under Putnam’s two‐level frame‐
work, chief EU negotiators respond to, and interact with,
different pressures, interests, and diplomatic strategies
that contribute to, or ostracize, a tentative agreement
among the parties at stake. For the purposes of this arti‐
cle, different EU policy actors on level I (different EP
political groups, national delegations andMEPs) are seen
as responding to various domestic pressures originating
from level II (domestic constituencies, parties, or govern‐
ments in place).
This article is mainly preoccupied with the definition
of win‐sets or of ‘all possible Level I agreements that
would “win,” that is gain the necessary majority among
the [domestic] constituents, when simply voted up or
down’ at the EP (Putnam, 1988, p. 437). By providing the
right analytical tools for breaking down the win‐sets of
different EP political groups on the basis of their stated
position and internal debate on amechanism for refugee
relocation, as well as for studying how domestic poli‐
tics influenced MEPs’ voting behaviour and the degree
of intra‐group cohesion and intra‐EP overall unity, the
two‐level game framework constitutes the most suitable
model for analysing how levels I and II competing politi‐
cal interests influence policy outcomes at the EP.
As shown in Figure 1, Putnam’s two‐level game
defines clear mechanisms based on which multi‐party
negotiations take place. In situations of high politicisa‐
tion at level II, we would expect negotiations at level I to
be politicised as well, ultimately rendering the size of the
political groups’win‐sets smaller across the political spec‐
trum (shrinkage of win‐sets or tie‐hands). The more EP
political groups are united and internally cohesive on the
issue at stake, the more we would expect chief negotia‐
tors in EP political groups (i.e., rapporteurs and shadow
rapporteurs) to try and restructure the Commission’s pro‐
posal by: a) pushing forward an ambitious wish list of
amendments in the EP Report on the second Refugee
Relocation Decision (European Parliament, 2015c); and
b) demanding more concessions or tying its own hands
by pretending that there is no room for manoeuvre at
the domestic level. Vice versa, the more decentralized
the governance of a political group is, the higher the like‐
lihood will be for MEPs to escape their mandate originat‐
ing from level II (Ripoll Servent, 2014, p. 372) and to not
align with the group’s position. In this circumstance, we
would expect chief EU negotiators that want to achieve
a united position at the EU level to cut slack to their
MEPs so as to widen their win‐set, ultimately resulting
in a less ambitious group position. Another mechanism
that we expect to have affected intra‐EP negotiations
is a change of interests throughout the negotiations,
often due to the ‘reverberation’ of international pres‐
sures within domestic politics (Putnam, 1988, p. 456), or
vice versa.
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Figure 1.Mechanisms of a two‐level game. Source: Adapted fromMoravcsik (1993, p. 32) and Ripoll Servent (2014, p. 572).
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In terms of methods, the article is built upon a
multi‐method research framework rooted in the deduc‐
tive theory‐testing side of process tracing, as defined
by Bennett and Checkel (2014, pp. 7–8) as a method‐
ological technique that ‘examines the observable impli‐
cations of hypothesized causalmechanismswithin a case
to test whether a theory on these mechanisms explains
the case.’ By operationalising Putnam’s two‐level game,
the article looks at the causal mechanism between
the observed outcome, or the unambitious role of
the Parliament in the formulation of the two Refugee
Relocation Decisions, and the partial explanation of
bottom‐up politicization of the policy issue at stake.
As shown in the following sections, the particular legisla‐
tive procedure in use—consultation—in the making of
the two selected policies was a necessary and sufficient
condition for the EP to be a structurally marginal policy
actor. However, what rendered the EP’s policy agenda
even more unambitious was the lack of intra‐EP unity,
which resulted in unusually conservative opinions in the
two procedures.
This framework is integrated with a set of primary
and secondary sources, including: six semi‐structured
elite interviews undertaken between October 2018 and
January 2019 (see Annex I in the Supplementary File);
vote analysis; and documentary research, spanning from
press briefings to European Council conclusions, from
interviewees’ meeting calendars to EP group position
papers on migration. The findings are triangulated with
secondary literature on, and media coverage of, the
intergovernmental and interinstitutional debate preced‐
ing the adoption of the two Decisions.
3. The EP and Early Agenda‐Setting on Refugee
Relocation (2013–2015)
From as early as 2013, the EP attempted in different
occasions to propose a Union‐wide relocation mech‐
anism for refugee redistribution. In a debate in late
February 2013 (European Parliament, 2013a), the EP
questioned the then JHA Commissioner CeciliaMalström
about the Commission’s commitment to table a legisla‐
tive proposal for an intra‐European relocation scheme,
shaped on the basis of the past pilot projects of intra‐EU
refugee relocation for the benefit of Malta (the so‐called
EUREMA I and II). While stating that the Commissionwas
‘very happy with the EUREMA scheme,’ Malmström con‐
cluded, as based on the limited commitment of mem‐
ber states in implementing the pilot project EUREMA II
(only 14 were relocated), that ‘there [was] not the [right]
political climate… to propose such a scheme’ without
incurring in ‘a robust no…[or] a paper tiger’ (European
Parliament, 2013a).
Despite the clear political unworkability of relocation,
Lampedusa’s migrant shipwreck of 3 October 2013 gave
the EP enough political momentum to reopen a debate
about the situation in the Mediterranean and possi‐
ble reforms of the AFSJ. A first EP resolution was pub‐
lished just days after the tragedy in the Mediterranean,
encouragingmember states and the Commission, among
other things, to show ‘greater solidarity with Member
States facing particular pressure’ (European Parliament
resolution of 23 October 2013, 2013b). Less than two
weeks later, the EP published another resolution, reit‐
erating the legal obligation for member states to assist
migrants at sea, as well as the need for responsibility‐
sharing. It recommended ‘creating a mechanism based
on objective criteria to reduce the pressure on those
Member States receiving higher numbers of asylum
seekers and beneficiaries of international protection,
in either absolute or proportional terms’ (European
Parliament, 2013c, p. 6).
While the immediate public and political response
to Lampedusa’s tragedy was to pledge for ‘no more
deaths’ in the Mediterranean (Muiznieks, 2015), the
increased resources invested in search and rescue oper‐
ations did not have the results expected in the short
run. The EP gathered renewed momentum on the issue
under the Italian Council Presidency and with the start
of a more “political” Commission under Juncker’s lead‐
ership (Kassim & Laffan, 2019; Nugent & Rhinard, 2019).
Following the JHA Council of early December 2014, the
EP stressed in another resolution ‘the need for the EU to
step up fair sharing of responsibility and solidarity… and
recall[ed] the obligations deriving from Art. 78 and 79
TFEU’ (European Parliament resolution of 17 December
2014, 2014).
A critical juncture on the issue was only to come
on 18 April 2015, when a shipwreck disaster leaving
over 700 migrants dead shook the European Council
and prompted a EUCO special summit on 23 April 2015,
where member states called on the Commission to
‘consider options for organising emergency relocation
between all member states on a voluntary basis’ (Council
of the European Union, 2015, p. 2). This message was
reiterated in another EP resolution, which called ‘on
the Commission to establish a binding quota for the
distribution of asylum seekers among all the Member
States’ (European Parliament resolution of 29 April 2015,
2015d). In other words, in spite of the EP’s active efforts
in setting the policy agenda on the issue at stake, it
was only when the Commission’s willingness to table a
refugee relocation scheme was echoed by the European
Council that a proposal for voluntary relocation was
tabled by the Commission.
4. EP Groups’ Positions on Refugee Relocation and
Resettlement
While the EP as a whole lobbied member states and
other EU institutions with one single voice, all groups
came up with a different position paper ahead of the
EUCO special summit on migration of April 2015: These
papers reflected primarily the groups’ sets of acceptable
agreements, or win‐sets, on the issues of refugee relo‐
cation and burden‐sharing. Each group’s position was
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evaluated, as summarized in Table 1, in relation to its
published position paper (if existing). In so doing, it
was possible to define: a) the group’s desired “policy
focus” for a refugee relocation scheme (refugee ori‐
ented;MS capacity; executive control; not defined); b) its
preference on the nature of refugee relocation (volun‐
tary; binding; substituting Dublin; permanent; tempo‐
rary); the group’s degree of unity on the issue at stake
(low; moderate; high); and c) the aggregate size of the
group’s win‐set (narrow or broad). Seeing as neither the
Eurosceptic Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy
Group (EFDD) nor the far‐right Europe of Nations and
Freedom Group (ENF) came up with a position paper in
the outbreak of the migration crisis, it was not possible
to determine either of these variables for them.
The most proactive groups were the Greens/EFA
and the GUE/NGL. The Greens/EFA argued for ‘visa‐free
travel’ for Syrian refugees and for a relocation sys‐
tem focused on the refugees’ preferences, language
and culture in order to replace the Dublin Regulation
(Greens/EFA, 2015, p. 2) and most importantly to reform
the way in which the latter assigns responsibility for
examining asylum applications to the countries of first
entry in the EU, thereby putting enormous pressure
on frontline Member States. The GUE/NGL threatened
that their MEPs would be opposing any EU budget
that would go against the ‘activation of Temporary
Protection Directive 2001/55/EC… increase[d] sharing of
reception of asylum‐seekers between Member States,
including through relocation programmes that take fully
into account family, language and cultural ties, ade‐
quate funding and reception conditions and closing
down of detention centres’ (GUE/NGL, 2016, pp. 1–2).
In other words, strong of its internal cohesion on the
issue at stake, the group tried to be influential in inter‐
institutional negotiations by tying its own hands.
Both the European People’ Party (EPP) and the
Socialists & Democrats (S&D) supported the idea of a
binding mechanism for refugee relocation based on a
variety of criteria reflecting the member state’s capacity.
They nonetheless differed inwin‐sets on a variety of fun‐
damental issues at stake. The S&D ‘wanted a legally bind‐
ing, permanent relocation’ system (Interview 1), with a
comprehensive basis for the key redistribution criteria,
reflecting both the member state’s capacity and the indi‐
vidual asylum seeker’s preferences. The EPP instead lob‐
bied for a refugee distribution scheme based on solely
objective criteria (EPP, 2015, p. 7), such as territorial
size, population, economic situation, and the number
of migrants already present in the country. In Putnam’s
terms, the EPP had a relatively narrower win‐set on
refugee relocation as compared to the other groups,
meaning that it had less room for manoeuvre (tied
hands). According to Christian Democrat MEP Jeroen
Lenaers from the EPP—at the time also shadow rap‐
porteur on the first file—concerns about asylum seek‐
ers’ preferences were secondary or even tertiary in the
discussion, whereas the whole EPP debate was fully
on whether there should be a binding or non‐binding
mechanism for refugee relocation (Interview 2). As from
Spring of 2015, the group initiated a discussion relat‐
ing to the potential costs and benefits of no agreement,
as well as the potential benefits which would originate
from the ratification of the Scheme. As explained byMEP
Lenaers, the group did not like the option of binding relo‐
cation, but abode by it in order to maintain pressure on
the Council (cut‐slack):
It was never our favourite solution… but we under‐
stand we are in a crisis situation….The only thing we
could do [was] delay the procedure really… which is
something we really didn’t want to do because the
Parliament was in a majority in favour for a binding
relocation measure so we wanted to keep pressure
on the Member States. (Interview 2)
In March 2015, the Alliance of Democrats & Liberals
(ALDE) Party had already held a seminar on the topic
Table 1. Summary of groups’ policy positions on a refugee relocation scheme.
Group Position Paper Policy focus Nature of Scheme Expected group unity Size of win‐set
ALDE Yes MS capacity and Permanent, substituting Moderate Broad
refugee oriented Dublin
ECR Yes Executive control Voluntary and temporary High Narrow
EFDD No N/D N/D N/D N/D
ENF No N/D N/D N/D N/D
Greens/EFA Yes Refugee oriented Permanent High Narrow
GUE/NGL Yes Refugee oriented Permanent, substituting High Narrow
Dublin
EPP Yes MS capacity Binding but temporary Moderate/Low Narrow
S&D Yes MS capacity and Binding and permanent Moderate Broad
refugee oriented
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(ALDE Party, 2015), which then resulted in the creation
of ALDE’s Blueprint for a New European Agenda on
Migration on 23 April: In the document, ALDE called for
the introduction of a centralized, two‐step refugee dis‐
tribution scheme in replacement of Dublin. This entailed
the voluntary offer of relocation spaces by eachMember
State; if not enough, this had to be integrated with com‐
pulsory redistribution, as based ‘on both quantitative
data (GDP and theMember State’s population) and qual‐
itative data (language, cultural ties, family ties of the
refugee)’ (ALDE, 2015, p. 6). As explained by an ALDE
political advisor (Interview 3), the number of political
stances comprised within the group—21 member states
and 60 national parties—prompted an early formation of
the group’s win‐set on migration.
The main task for the ALDE shadow rapporteurs
and political advisors was to clarify and provide reas‐
surance on the content of the legislative texts to their
MEPs. This was done so as to ensure that the procedu‐
ral complexity and negative press coverage for refugee
relocation—possibly threatening a change of domestic
interests throughout the negotiations, or reverberation
effect in Putnam’s words (1988, pp. 454–455)—would
not get in the way of showing the group’s support at ple‐
nary (Interview 3). This proved challenging due to the
presence within the Group of eight parties that were
at the time part of national governing coalitions (rever‐
beration of domestic interests): In the face of increas‐
ing popularity of far‐right, anti‐migrant parties andmove‐
ments at home, these parties in government would be
sending different (i.e., more realist) messages to their
domestic audience (level I) than they would within ALDE
(level II). On the political debate surrounding the first
Commission’s proposal, the same advisor stated:
They [Ministers] might be saying one thing in the
Council, and then saying [to] their colleagues and
MEPs a slightly different thing. No, no it’s not manda‐
tory, but yes, yes, it is mandatory….Having to explain
[at the national level] that it’s not mandatory but
in the end we reached the same [result] because
Member States are basically, not very publicly, but
pretty much signed up to the same numbers as the
Commission put forward in the mandatory Scheme.
(Interview 3)
Compared to the other groups, the European Conservat‐
ives and Reformists (ECR) clarified that, for them, reloca‐
tion ought to be based only on voluntary contributions
made by governments—i.e., executive decision‐making
centralized at level II—and was sceptical towards the
proposed distribution key, insofar as ‘[s]tatistics, num‐
bers, and graphs rarely reflect the true local and national
effects of decisions in the area of migration and asylum’
(Kirkhope, 2015, p. 3).
The only two groups not to clarify theirwin‐setswith
a position paper were the EFDD and the ENF: the refusal
to do so pertained mainly to the great diversity of polit‐
ical stances at stake in the two groups, as well as the
ENF’s late foundation (15 June 2015). As a result, both
the EFDD and the ENF left their MEPs ‘absolute free‐
domof vote’ (Interview 4), with no attempt at consensus‐
seeking (Interview 5).
5. Level I Politics in the European Parliament
With the EP’s Committee on Civil Liberties, JHA (LIBE) in
charge for drafting a report on the two legislative files,
the main objective for appointed rapporteur Ska Keller
(Greens/EFA) was primarily ‘to put down in black and
white a bit of what we thought about it, and what
were our requests’ (Interview 5). The results obtained
on the first Refugee Relocation Decision in the rela‐
tive Committee vote—42 members in favour, 13 against,
3 abstentions—were praised by rapporteur Ska Keller as
an example for the Council of unity:
While member states are muddling through and can‐
not agree on how to distribute 40,000 refugees, our
committee has supported a binding distribution key
by a large majority….We are also calling for a perma‐
nent distribution mechanism which must go substan‐
tially beyond the current proposals….Respecting the
interests of refugees is essential for the success of the
distribution key. (LIBE Committee, 2015)
As explored in the following paragraphs, the cross‐group
unity achieved by the rapporteur on this and the sec‐
ond Committee votes came at the cost of a less ambi‐
tious and maximalist agenda tabled by the EP as a whole
on refugee relocation and responsibility‐sharing, in order
to bring the Conservatives and Centre‐Right on board
(cut‐slack).
When commenting on how the LIBE report was
drafted, an ALDE advisor explained how, while politi‐
cal support from the S&D, ALDE, the Greens/EFA and
GUE/NGL was almost automatic in view of ‘a kind of
alliance… on these issues’ (Interview 3), this was not the
case for the EPP. According to MEP Lenaers—substitute
member for the LIBE Committee—the rapporteur knew
that ‘she needed at least half of the EPP to get a majority
in the European Parliament’ (Interview 2). For this to be
the case, the rapporteur ensured that the preferences of
asylum seekerswould only be included ‘to the extent pos‐
sible,’ whereas the numbers of refugees to be relocated
would be kept unchanged, with a possible adjustment
accounting for the evolution throughout the Summer of
2015 (Interview 2). The political compromise found was
reflected in a swift change in the amendments postu‐
lated in the final EP report: Thanks to these adjustments,
fourteen out of the fifteen roll‐call votes requested by
the ECR and the EFDD and tabled in the plenary of 9
September passed by majority.
While the draft report had called for an amend‐
ment in numbers of asylum seekers to be relocated
from 40,000 to 50,000 (European Parliament, 2015a,
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pp. 8, 16), in the final report it was only in an explana‐
tory statement that the rapporteur suggested to increase
in the future that number ‘to 50,000 as a minimum’
(European Parliament, 2015c, p. 34).
A similar adjustment wasmade in relation to the inte‐
gration of preferences of asylum seekers and towhatwas
politically attainable for the EPP on this policy matter.
As suggested in the final report:
Neither refugees have a right to choose their pre‐
ferred Member State nor do Member States have a
right to choose their preferred applicants. But their
preferences should be taken into account to the
extent possible. (European Parliament, 2015c, p. 35)
Alongside said effort in wording, the EPP also ensured
that its MEPs who attended the LIBE vote would all be
aligned to the found compromise:
Whatwe did try to do of course is tomake sure that in
the LIBE vote, so in Committee vote, wewould have…
people there that would represent the EPP line. And
the EPP group line was that we were in favour of a
mandatory binding mechanism. So, for instance, you
tried to make sure that [when] people were absent
from the vote, that they are being replaced by people
who follow the EPP group line and not people who…
go against the EPP group line. (Interview 2)
This was mirrored in the substitutions made for the LIBE
vote on the report: Among the substitute members who
were present for the vote on 28 July, four out of eleven
were MEPs from moderate parties within the EPP group,
namely: Sweden’s Moderate Party, the Spanish Partido
Popular, the Dutch Christian Democratic Appeal or CDA
and the Greek New Democracy. Under rule 200(2) of
the EP Rules of Procedure, four out of six of the substi‐
tutions made followed the same political rationale and
comprised substitutes from the following moderate par‐
ties: the German CDU, the Bulgarian GERB, the Belgian
CD‐V, and the Dutch CDA. The ways in which the EPP
quickly aligned to the compromise found despite pres‐
sures at level II suggests a high degree of centralization
and group discipline, as reported in other scholarly liter‐
ature (Hix, 2002, pp. 690–691).
The legislative procedure for the second Refugee
Relocation Decision—a total of thirteen days from
the proposal on 9 September and its adoption on
22 September 2015—was much shorter than the
first one. As a result of the short timing and the
mostly unchanged legislative text, neither the LIBE
nor the Budget Committees produced a different
opinion. The only remarkable aspect was to see
how domestic contestation weighed in preparatory EP
debates (European Parliament, 2015b). In a debate on
8 September, a striking amount of references to domes‐
tic pressures and national preferences was reported
among MEPs. Non‐affiliated MEP Korwin‐Mikke from
Poland highlighted how his country ‘has dozens of prob‐
lems, [and] we have a problem with migrants,’ and
defined the relocation policy as an ‘absurd policy…
this will lead to the destruction of Europe.’ Slovak
MEP Benová (S&D) brought attention to the fact that
‘these issues are viewed differently dependent on which
Member State you are talking about’ and reproached
to EU institutions how they ‘did not find a manner to
get this issue across the population’ and communicate it
in an effective manner. Czech MEP Mach (EFDD) threat‐
ened that ‘if you vote a binding quota through in our
country [Czechia], then the public would not like to
remain in the EU.’ As shown in Section 6, domestic pol‐
itics had heavy repercussions on the degree and nature
of coalition‐building at the EP, particularly in the second
consultation procedure on 14 September 2015.
Looking at the voting dynamics in the two plenar‐
ies (see Table 2), the total number of favouring MEPs
(pro votes) in the second Refugee Relocation Decision—
diverged from the first one by 25 percentage points.
All centrist and liberal‐leaning groups lost between 18%
up to 38%of “Yes” votes.While the amount of “No” votes
(anti votes) went consistently down except for S&D, on
a whole, 15 more MEPs abstained (abst. votes) and 143
more MEPs were absent (absent votes) in the second as
compared to the first roll‐call vote. The increase in absen‐
tees by two to four times was visible in all groups.
Commenting on the change in intra‐EPP voting
dynamics between the first and second plenary votes,
MEP Lenaers stated that there was neither a push for
MEPs to vote in favour of the second Refugee Relocation
Decision nor to be absent for the plenary:
[I]n our...parliamentary group, there is always room,
if you have a principled issue, to vote according to
your conscience, so that [pushing to be absent] was
not...not something we tried....We tried of course to
ease with as many people as possible… if you are
not in favour of this, try at least, if you could at least
abstain instead of voting against. (Interview 2)
A similar take on absenteeism was shared by an ALDE
political advisor, according to whom there is always
within ALDE ‘a variable of people half for whatever rea‐
son they are not present, maybe [due to a] long session
of plenary or they make mistakes’ (Interview 3). The sub‐
stantial increase in defections and absentees makes an
analysis of level II politics and voting pressures essential
in order to either confirm these takes on absenteeism
or put it into question in the face of potential level II
pressures coming from national parties or governments
in place.
6. The Impact of Level II Politics in the EP
This layer of voting analysis is particularly useful
to analyse whether MEPs from the countries that
either rejected or abstained from the second Refugee
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Table 2. Voting behaviour on legislative resolutions A8‐0245/2015 and C8‐0271/2015, by EP political group.
Pro Pro Anti Anti Abst. Abst. Absent Absent
Group Vote 1 Vote 2 %Δ Vote 1 Vote 2 %Δ Vote 1 Vote 2 %Δ Vote 1 Vote 2 %Δ
ALDE 51 42 −0.18 7 4 −0.43 4 3 −0.25 9 22 1.44
ECR 9 2 −0.78 58 49 −0.16 0 6 6.00 7 17 1.43
EFDD 17 17 0.00 25 23 −0.08 1 0 −1.00 2 5 1.50
ENF 0 0 0.00 36 25 −0.31 1 0 −1.00 1 13 12.00
GUE/NGL 42 26 −0.38 2 0 −1.00 2 4 1.00 6 21 2.50
NI 0 1 0.00 9 3 −0.67 1 0 −1.00 4 11 1.75
EPP 158 115 −0.27 18 14 −0.22 26 31 0.19 15 57 2.80
S&D 173 133 −0.23 3 6 1.00 2 10 4.00 12 41 2.42
Greens/EFA 48 36 −0.25 0 0 0.00 0 0 0 2 14 6.00
TOTAL 498 372 −0.25 158 124 −0.22 37 54 0.46 58 201 2.47
Relocation Decision at the Council level—namely, CZ, HU,
SK, RO, and FI—faced level II pressures to vote in one
direction or the other at the EP (tie‐hands). It is also use‐
ful to analyse the voting behaviour of PolishMEPs, seeing
as the support provided by the Polish government at the
time, led by EUCO President Tusk’s Civic Platform party,
was absolutely essential to build a strong qualifiedmajor‐
ity at the Council (Interview 6) without causing a seri‐
ous rift and a real division between Central‐Eastern and
Western Europeanmember states (Interview 7). In order
to better visualize how bottom‐up politicization was
reflected in the voting dynamics of the second refugee
relocation decision (Council Decision (EU) 2015/1601 of
22 September 2015, 2015), the analysis undertaken is
streamlined into Table 3, alongside Appendixes I and II in
the Supplementary File: Appendixes I and II look at the
voting behaviour of MEPs by member state on the two
EP legislative files. Table 3 cross‐references this informa‐
tion with the voting behaviour of parties in government
from the member states selected above.
The Polish delegation to the EPPmostly aligned to the
group’s request to abstain,when unwilling to support the
majority. In fact, the number of Polish MEPs abstaining
in the second decision increased by five, as followed by a
decrease in “Yes” votes (from 11 to 4): All of the abstain
votes from Poland came from the then‐governing EPP
coalition led by the Civic Platform and its junior coalition
partner Polish People’s Party. These two parties in gov‐
ernment not only led the national Abstain front but also
the national efforts at the EP to side with the majority
(see Table 3). This could suggest that the EPP’s request to
abstain instead of voting against was respected by Polish
MEPs, in a way anticipating Poland’s later inclination to
side with the majority at the Council level. The then gov‐
erning party and its PM Ewa Kopacz were in fact steered
by President Juncker towards siding with the majority
as they had already foreseen losing the upcoming elec‐
tions regardless of their voting behaviour on these files
(Interview 6).
The voting behaviour of the Romanian delegation
to the EP seemingly mirrored Romania’s rejection of
the second Decision at the level of the Council (see
Table 3): Within the governing coalition—composed by
an EPP‐S&D coalition (Partidul National Liberal, or PNL,
and Partidul Social Democrat, or PSD)—the only “Yes”
vote came from S&D Vice‐Chair Bostinaru, whereas the
Table 3. Level II politics in the formulation of the Council Decision 2015/1601.
Member State Voting Behaviour at the Council Parties in govt (EP group affiliation) Voting behaviour at the EP
Czech Republic Against CSDD (S&D) 3 against; 1 missing
ANO 2011 (ALDE) 2 against; 2 missing
Hungary Against Fidesz 8 missing; 3 against
Christian Democratic People’s Party 1 missing
Slovakia Against Smer‐SD (S&D) 3 against; one missing
Romania Against PNL (EPP) 6 against; 1 abstain; 1 missing
PSD (S&D) 5 abstain; 6 missing; 1 for
Finland Abstain Centre Party (ALDE) 1 abstain; 2 missing
National Coalition Party (EPP) 1 for; 2 missing
Finns’ Party (ECR) 1 against; 1 missing
Poland In Favour Polish People’s Party (EPP) 3 abstain; 1 missing
Civic Platform (EPP) 3 for; 13 abstain; 2 missing
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rest of the PSD abstained or did not attend the vote.
The overwhelming majority of the PNL—including EPP
Vice‐Chair Marinescu—voted against it.
Similarly, the Slovak delegation voted in line with the
country’s rejection at the level of the Council rather than
the S&D’s position, with three out of four MEPs belong‐
ing to the governing party Direction‐Social Democracy
voting against.
This was also the case for the Czech parties in gov‐
ernment at the time: Česká strana sociálně demokratická,
or CSSD (from the S&D), and its junior coalition partner
ANO 2011 (from ALDE) either voted against the Council
Decision 2015/1601 or did not attend the plenary, includ‐
ing ALDE Vice‐Chair Telička. Commenting on the Czech
delegation’s voting behaviour, an ALDE political advisor
suggested that, despite ALDE’s affiliation of the then‐PM:
There was some kind of acceptance and they
explained… for national reasons we have a different
position. We did have discussions about other ways
around this… but when the nature of these consulta‐
tions is basically saying yes or no, there’s not much
room for manoeuvre, or discussions, so they were
kind of left behind. (Interview 3)
Most MEPs from Hungary’s and Finland’s parties in
government were absent at the plenary, suggesting
they may have been subject to pressures coming from
their own electorate/government and coalition partner
respectively to vote in line with their own country’s atti‐
tudes at the Council.
7. Conclusion
This article has conceptualized the negotiations leading
to the adoption of two Refugee Relocation Decisions
(Council Decision (EU) 2015/1523 of 14 September 2015,
2015; Council Decision (EU) 2015/1601 of 22 September
2015, 2015) as a two‐level game involving primarilyMEPs
as responding to different pressures coming from their
own EP political group and national party.
The empirical analysis has shown the importance of
this analytical approach insofar as, by means of a two‐
level conceptual approach, it has shown how bottom‐
up politicization of the policy issues at stake made the
EP more internally divided from within, despite work‐
ing under consultation, and ultimately led to an unambi‐
tious policy agenda. Under consultation, the only nego‐
tiating leverage left to the EP would have been to be
united to be influential and to advance forward‐looking
amendments. However, the Rapporteur’s need to get
the Centre‐Right on board to come across as united in
front of other EU institutions came at the cost of a less
far‐reaching Opinion. Indeed, the EPP’s concerns were
successfully integrated into the final text insofar as the
group had a relatively narrowerwin‐set (tied hands) com‐
pared to othermainstreamEP groups andonly sidedwith
the majority on the two Council Decisions as the ben‐
efits from ratifying it surpassed the costs of blocking it
(Interview 3).
As shown in this article, the policy issue(s) at stake
reverberated so strongly at home, particularly in Central
and Eastern Europe, that level II political considerations
were as important as, or even trumped, the MEP’s loy‐
alty to their EP political group’s line, leaving MEPs torn
between “competing principals” and compromising the
unity of the EP on this issue. This was particularly the
case for MEPs from governing parties in countries that
voted against Council Decision 2015/1601. The only suc‐
cessful tactic of level I consensus‐seeking consisted in
asking MEPs who did not comply to the group’s position
to abstain, or ensuring those attending the voting ses‐
sion at the LIBE Committee would be supportive of the
group’s majority line (Interview 2).
These findings represent a key contribution to the
scholarly debate on politicization in the European Union
(see, for instance, Högenauer, 2017; Schmidt, 2019), as
they illustrate how increasing pressures from the bottom
and polarized debates at the EU level, such as the ones
permeating EU policy‐making during the migration cri‐
sis, are increasingly weakening the EP’s transnationalism
due to the competing interests on related policy matters
(Högenauer, 2017, pp. 1105–1106), with the unintended
consequence of further undermining the EP’s bargaining
position in JHA affairs.
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